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COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF TRUSTS
by
Harvie Branscomb, Jr.-* and G. Ray Miller, Jr.**
A S the concept of the trust form evolved under the English law,
there was no thought that trusts would be widely used in juris-
dictions where a large part of the property would be the commun-
ity property of marital partners and in which the ownership of in-
come from property might differ from the ownership of the prop-
erty itself. Similarly, the community property system developed over
the centuries in the civil law countries of southern Europe and found
its way to Spanish America and the southwestern United States with-
out any provision for the separation of legal and equitable titles which
trust arrangements entail. As the economies of the community prop-
erty states have matured and as trusts in this area have multiplied,
many questions, largely unanswered, have arisen with respect to the
interplay of the two concepts.
The problems which arise are fundamental. If a husband funds a
trust with community property, retaining powers such as a power
of revocation, is this power held for the benefit of himself or the
marital community? If community, does it survive the death, incom-
petency or divorce of his wife? If the husband becomes incompetent
or predeceases the wife, does the wife have any such power there-
after? Where a member of the marital community is the beneficiary
of a trust, are distributions to him out of the income of the trust
community or separate property? 'Where trust income is retained
and accumulated, does the community estate acquire some interest
in undistributed trust assets? If not, does this income when sub-
sequently distributed become community property? Generally, is the
equitable interest of the community estate in a trust to be conceived
of in terms of the beneficial rights or powers held under the trust
instrument, or does it extend to include an interest in the underlying
trust assets?
Delicate distinctions over control, necessary in order to determine
the federal tax consequences of trust transactions, raise additional
issues. Are the powers of the husband who establishes a revocable
trust out of community property personal to him, as suggested by
some courts, or does he hold such powers as agent for the marital
* Attorney at Law, Corpus Christi, Texas. A.B., Duke University; LL.B., Yale University.
Chairman, Tax Section of State Bar of Texas, 1961-62.
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community, as suggested by others? Is the relationship between hus-
band and wife under such circumstances one in which the husband
cannot act without acting also on behalf of his spouse? If such a
power is exercised by the husband, does the property revert to the
husband or to the marital community or its successors? As a practical
matter, how can trust arrangements which are commonplace in sepa-
rate property systems be applied to community property in a way
so that the same benefits and flexibility will be attained?
I. COMMUNITY TRUST POWERS
The Nature of Retained Control An informal survey of the larger
banks in the Southwest discloses that the great majority of inter vivos
trusts administered by such fiduciaries is revocable. Most of these
trusts have probably been funded with community property. There-
fore, potential legal and tax problems are undoubtedly widespread in
the states in which both the community property system and the
common law prevail-Texas, California, New Mexico, Nevada, Wash-
ington, Idaho, and Arizona.' The common law has never been adopted
in Louisiana, and, for this reason, that state is considered beyond the
scope of this Article.!
The decided cases in the common law community property states,
in the absence of statute, follow the rule prevailing elsewhere4 that
revocability must be expressly retained; irrevocability follows as a
matter of law otherwise. More recently, some states, including Texas'
and California,' have enacted statutes designed to avoid an irrevoca-
'DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY (1st ed. 1943); MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1952); Jackson, Community Property and Federal Taxes, 12 Sw. L.J.
1 (1958). Similar problems may arise with respect to revocable trusts in separate property
states, such as the question whether a revocable trust established by the husband during
marriage will effectively cut off the statutory share of such property which the wife would
have had, if the property had been a part of the husband's estate. See Scott, The Revocable
Trust and the Surviving Spouse's Statutory Share in Colorado, 36 CoLo. L. REV. 464 (1964).
aIn 1964 the Louisiana Legislature enacted its first comprehensive statute relating to
trusts. Louisiana Trust Code, LA. REv. STAT. 9:1721-9:2252 (1964). Previously, the au-
thority for the creation of private trusts had been limited, with no statutory authority prior
to 1920.
'Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 154 P. 306 (1916); Kopp v. Gunther, 95
Cal. 63, 30 P. 301 (1892); Monday v. Vance, 92 Tex. 428, 49 S.W. 516 (1899); Holmes
v. Holmes, 65 Wash. 572, 118 P. 733 (1911). There appears to be no express authority in
Arizona, New Mexico, Idaho and Nevada.4
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 330 (1965); BOGERT, TRUSTS § 1000 (2d ed.
1962).5 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-41 (1960).
'CAL. CIv. CODE 5 2280, as amended by Cal. L. 1931, ch. 950, p. 1955. Oklahoma has
adopted a similar statute, 60 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 175.41. See also more limited statutes in
Maryland, Md. L. 1951, ch. 312, art. 16, § 108; North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Sess. L. § 39-6
(1950); New York, N.Y. Personal Property Law § 23 (1962); Wisconsin, Wis. L. 1961, ch.
407, S 231.50.
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ble commitment except where the trust expressly provides for it.
Even though in such states it is not necessary to specify in the instru-
ment itself that a power to revoke is retained,7 it is the usual practice
for careful draftsmen to do so if the power is desired. Therefore, in
these as in other states, the existence and scope of the power may
depend to a considerable extent on the language of the individual
instrument.
It is significant that, for purposes of state law, a revocable trust
is effective for most purposes when it is established, not when the
power to revoke may subsequently lapse or terminate. It is for this
reason that the trust effectively removes property from the probate
estate of the donor' and may also enable the donor to remove prop-
erty from his wife's estate without her joinder.! For the same reason,
a revocable trust is not subject to the Statute of Wills.
The Statute of Wills cases emphasize the significance of the con-
tractual and fiduciary rights and duties which come into being when
a revocable trust is established, and which distinguish true trust from
transfers to a "trustee" which are legally treated as agency arrange-
ments. Although a tentative" or illusory trust" is no trust at all and
terminates in any event at death or incompetency under the familiar
rules of agency, the retention of a power of revocation is insufficient
to create an agency arrangement unless accompanied by extensive
other powers. For this reason, a revocable trust may continue after
the death of the settlor, although his power to revoke will ordinarily
not survive him, and is non-assignable while in force." Thus, in
trust terminology, a power to revoke is a "personal" power,'5 even
McCauley v. Simmer, 336 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error dism., holding that
irrevocability will not be implied from the terms of the instrument.
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 330 (1965).
'Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 913 (1959) (construing Texas law).
"Ibid.; Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, 256 App. Div. 26, 9 N.Y.S.2d 648
(1939), aff'd mem., 281 N.Y. 760, 24 N.E.2d 20 (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 57 (1965); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 57 (2d ed. 1956); BOGERT, TRUSTS § 104 (2d
ed. 1965); Scott, The Effects of a Power To Revoke a Trust, 57 HARV. L. REV. 362 (1944).
'Fleck v. Baldwin, 141 Tex. 340, 172 S.W.2d 957 (1943); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 58.3
(2d ed. 1956).
"Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS S 57.5 (2d
ed. 1956); 1 NOSSAMAN, TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND TAXATrON 63 (2d ed. 1965).
'" Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 913 (1959); Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, 256 App. Div. 26, 9
N.Y.S.2d 648 (1939), aff'd mem., 281 N.Y. 760, 24 N.E.2d 20 (1939); Beirne v. Con-
tinental Equitable Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 A. 721 (1932); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 57.1
(2d ed. 1956); BOGERT, TRUSTS § 104 (2d ed. 1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 57 (1965); Scott, The Effects of a Power To Revoke a Trust, 57 HARV. L. REV. 362
(1944).
'4 Grove v. Payne, 47 Wash. 2d 461, 288 P.2d 424 (1955). Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S.
225 (1879); BOGERT, TRUSTS 5 1001 (2d ed. 1962).
I'BOGERT, TRUSTS § 1000 (2d ed. 1962).
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though from the standpoint of community property law the holder
of the power may or may not hold it in a "personal," as compared
with a community property, capacity."i
The effectiveness of a conveyance to a trustee, even though rev-
ocable, does not mean that the revocation power is without signifi-
cance. For example, the period within which vesting is required under
the rule against perpetuities probably begins when the power to re-
voke terminates, rather than at the date the trust is originally estab-
lished." More importantly, the retention of a power to revoke com-
pletely alters the federal tax consequences of a trust. Since the prop-
erty held in a trust which is revocable is regarded for federal income,"
gift"9 and estate ° tax purposes as the property of the person holding
the power, at least when exercisable by a single settlor competent to
act without the consent of an adverse party, it is the termination of
the power to revoke which is the effective date of the trust transaction
for such purposes."1
Revocable Trusts with Dual Settlors--Community Property The
application of these rules of substantive and federal tax law becomes
much more difficult where two settlors are involved, as where husband
and wife establish a trust out of community property. It is recognized
in separate property states that where two persons join in establishing
a trust, retaining a power to revoke, it is ordinarily not intended that
either will have the power to revoke without the consent of the other."
From this it usually follows, in the absence of provisions to the con-
1"Compare Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959) with Katz v. United States, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,384
(S.D. Cal. 1966).
17 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 373, 441(2) (1944); cf. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 261
S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref.
16INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 676, 671 (trustee not required to file fiduciary return
form 1041); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.641(a)-0(b), 1.641-4, 1.641(b)-2 (1956); Rev. Rul. 57-51,
1957-1 CUM. BULL. 171 (subchapter J. of TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954 not applicable to re-
vocable trusts).
19 Treas. Reg. 5 25.2511-2(c) (1961); Stiffel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.
1952).
2 TNT. REV. CODE OF' 1954, § 2038; property acquires a new basis at death, even if it
is acquired after the trust is established. Rev. Rul. 58-395, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 398 (step
up in basis applicable to community property revocable trusts, Rev. Rul. 66-283, 1966
TNT. REV. BULL. No. 39, at 17). However, the holding period probably runs from the date
of acquisition, and not from the date of death of a party with power to revoke. Cf. Rev.
Rul. 59-86, 1959-1, CUM. BULL. 209 (no new holding period, gifts in contemplation of
death); Rev. Rul. 59-220, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 210 (no new holding period, surviving
spouse, community property). Contra, Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327 (1930). TNT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 2053 (estate debts and administration expenses deductible for estate tax
purposes if paid with reasonable promptness); TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(a) (2)
(trust liable for estate taxes if not paid when due).
21 Commissioner v. Soloman, 124 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1941).
"Noble v. Rogan, 49 F. Supp. 370 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Croker v. Croker, 192 N.Y.
Supp. 666 (1921); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 330 (1965); BOGERT, TRUSTS 5
1001 (2d ed. 1962).
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trary, that since joint action is required, the trust will become irrev-
ocable upon the death or incapacity of either; and the trust is never
"revocable" in the sense that one individual has the unilateral power
to vest trust property in himself at will.2
The position of the spouses in a community property state is simi-
lar but is not identical. Since the husband possesses powers under laws
of all community property states to make gifts of community proper-
ty without his wife's signature, subject to varying limitations,24 rev-
ocable trusts of community property may be established by the hus-
band acting alone in many instances. Furthermore, a husband's power
to manage the community will ordinarily enable him to revoke the
trust with respect to community contributions, if powers of revoca-
tion exist under the instrument or by statute. On the other hand,
where a general power of revocation is granted in a trust or by sta-
tute, the wife ordinarily cannot exercise it during marriage."
A basic distinction is drawn between such powers held by the
husband on behalf of the community, and exercisable only for the
benefit of the community, and powers held individually to revoke in
favor of himself alone. In the leading case in the area, Commissioner
v. Chase Manhattan Bank," the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that a power to revoke created by a transfer of community
property to a trust in Texas was a community power, even though
retained in the name of the husband alone. It is clear that if the power
had been exercised during marriage, the property received would have
reverted to the community. Since the wife's position in such a trust is
2 Note 22 supra.
"4 In California, the husband is deprived of all power to give community property to
third persons unless the wife consents in writing. CAL. CiV. CODE § 172 (Deering 1960).
In Idaho, New Mexico, and Washington there are statutory requirements for the wife's
joinder in transfers of community realty. IDAHO CODE § 32-912 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-4-3 (1962); REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 26.16.040 (1961). If the husband does make
such a transfer to a third party without the wife's joinder, the New Mexico statute provides
that such transfer is void, and this may also be the result in Idaho. N.M. STAT. ANN. §
57-4-3 (1962); Wits-Keets-Poo v, Rowton, 28 Idaho 193, 152 P. 1064 (1915). If the
husband does have the authority to "give away" portions of the community without the
wife's joinder, this power is generally limited by his incapacity to act in fraud of the wife's
rights. La Tourette v. La Tourette, 15 Ariz. 200, 137 P. 426 (1914); Kohny v. Dunbar,
21 Idaho 258, 121 P. 544 (1912); Nixon v. Brown, 46 Nev. 439, 214 P. 524 (1923);
Beals v. Ceres, 25 N.M. 459, 185 P. 780 (1919); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192
Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27, 114 A.L.R. 531 (1937); Stewart v. Bank of Endicott, 82 Wash.
106, 143 P. 458 (1914).
21TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4619 (1959); note 24 supra.
"s259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
not adverse to that of the husband in the federal tax sense,2 7 the in-
come of the trust, so long as it is revocable, is taxed to the marital
community.
It is possible in some jurisdictions for a wife to make a gift to the
husband of her interest in community property, " and in all juris-
dictions for the husband to make a gift to the wife." In such in-
stances, the revocation power may be vested exclusively in a spouse
individually, as in Katz v. United States,1 decided under California
law. The holder of such a power is, therefore, the sole owner of the
property if the trust is revoked. In these circumstances, a taxable
gift of the wife's community interest occurs when the trust is set up,
and thereafter the trust is treated for tax and other legal purposes
as if it had been funded with separate property.
Prior Death of the Husband Problems with respect to the rev-
ocability of community property trusts become critical at the deaths
of the spouses. The legal consequences of the prior death of the hus-
band are more easily ascertained than the consequences of the prior
death of the wife. In the Chase Manhattan case, the court held
that the trust became irrevocable in its entirety upon the prior death
of the husband on the ground that, although the trust had been
created with property belonging to the community and was held for
the benefit of both, nevertheless the right to revoke was exercisable
only by the husband; and therefore it lapsed upon his death when
the community ceased to exist.
In the Chase Manhattan decision, the court recognized the well
established rule in Texas that a husband may dispose of community
property as he sees fit, absent fraud on his wife or creditors."2 There-
27 DeAmodio v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962). In order to establish an
adverse interest, the power to revoke must be exercisable only with the consent of a bene-
ficiary or holder of a general power of appointment. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 676,
672 (a). Commisisoner v. Makransky, 321 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1963); Laganas v. Commission-
er, 281 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1960). If, upon termination of the trust, the property would
vest solely in the husband, a power exercisable only with the consent of the wife would
not make the trust taxable to the husband, to the extent of the wife's beneficial interest
in the trust. However, where two individuals are co-donors and co-holders of the power to
revest the property in themselves jointly, no taxable adverse interest exists. DeAmodio v.
Commissioner, supra. The gift tax rules are substantially the same. Camp v. Commissioner,
195 F.2d 999 (1st Cir. 1952); Skouras v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1951).
28 Note 18 supra.29 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-3 (1962); REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 26.16.050 (1961);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 123.070 (1957); CAL. CIV. CODE § 158 (Deering 1960); IDAHO CODE
5 32-906 (1963). Dealing with real property, the case law of Arizona makes clear that
a wife may make a gift of her interest in community realty to her husband. Schofield v.
Gold, 26 Ariz. 296, 225 P. 71 (1924).
30Huie, Community Property as Applied to Life Insurance, 17 TEXAS L. REv. 121
(1939).
'*66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 12,384 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
21 Aaron v. Aaron, 173 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.
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fore, the court reasoned, where the husband predeceased the wife, it
was obvious that any capacity he had to change his mind had term-
inated, and the disposition of the property had become fixed. It would
follow that the wife's rights to question the trust transaction or to
participate in the exercise of the power were limited to the opportun-
ity to seek relief in the courts, if the transfer to the trust had been
a fraud on her,33 and did not include any succession to her husband's
power to revoke.
From a federal tax point of view, the court held that at the death
of the husband, one-half of the trust was taxable in the husband's
estate, and the other one-half became, at the same time, the subject
of a taxable gift from the wife. Since she was entitled to the income
from the trust for her life under the terms of the instrument, the
amount of the gift was reduced for tax purposes by the value of the
income rights retained by her out of her interest in the community.'
In the Chase Manhattan case, the power to revoke was retained by
express provisions in a trust established in 1928, prior to the enact-
ment of the Texas Trust Act. Does the same result follow where
revocability is a creature of statute, reserved to the "trustor" of the
trust, in absence of trust provisions otherwise? Certainly, the wife,
even if unnamed in the instrument, is a trustor in the economic
sense. It is clear she would also be recognized as such for federal tax
purposes' and for many purposes under state law."' Nevertheless, it
appears probable that courts will tend to follow the literal language
of the statute and limit the power to the husband, especially since,
with exceptions, he has the power of management, control, and dis-
position of his wife's interest in the community as a matter of state
law."
" In Texas, the heirs of a wife can also sue to set aside a gift by the husband out of the
community during the wife's life, on the grounds of fraud. Stramler v. Coe, 1S Tex. 211
(1855). However, there appears to be no authority whether the wife's heirs could seek to
set aside the exercise, subsequent to the wife's death, of a power of revocation on the ground
that it was a fraud upon the wife's estate. Whether, during coverture, the wife could obtain
a personal judgment aaginst the husband for her loss is not clear. See Irwin v. Irwin, 110
S.W. 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908). See also SPEER, MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS § 187 (4th
ed. 1961).
" Presumably, the same property would be taxed again thereafter in the estate of the
widow, in the absence of some intervening transaction. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 2036.
'Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930); Hopkins
v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930); Mim 3853, X-1 CuM. BULL. 139 (1930); X-1 CUM. BULL.
140 (1930).
" For example, the wife's joinder in a conveyance of community property is not necessary
in Texas and adds no force to the instrument. Griffiin v. Troup, Ind. School Dist., 163
S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref.
"
7
IDAHO CODE 5 32-906 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-3 (1953); REV. CODE
WASH. ANN. § 26.16.030-040 (1961); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4616 (1957).
See also MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS (1952).
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A different result may follow under such a statute if the wife's
name appears in the trust instrument as a "trustor." Although "the
trustor" is referred to in the singular in the statutes of both Texas
and California, it should probably be interpreted as applying to both
spouses where both are designated as trustors in the instrument. A
California case has by dicta so indicated." In such an instance, the
joint consent of both spouses is presumably required in order to re-
voke, unless the power so conferred on the wife is regarded as an in-
valid attempt by the husband to delegate a part of his statutory au-
thority to manage the community.
In the Katz case, the husband also predeceased the wife. Since, how-
ever, under California law the wife could and, in this case, did di-
vest herself of any interest in the trust property by express provisions
in the trust, to which she consented in writing, the court concluded
that the trust had effected a "transmutation" of the wife's one-half
interest in the community, which thereafter became exclusively sub-
ject to the personal dominion and control of the husband. Conse-
quently, in the Katz case, the entire trust was held to be within the
husband's estate for estate tax purposes." In all community property
states, the husband ordinarily has dominion and control over the
wife's community property. The court in Katz clearly rejected this
as a basis for its decision and predicated its conclusion upon the lan-
guage of the trust instrument and the capacity of the wife to divest
herself of her interest under California law.
The community property states differ on the capacity of the wife
to make an effective gift of her interest in the community to the hus-
band,' and the issue seems far from settled in Texas."1 However, even
if it is ultimately held that the wife has the power to make an out-
right inter-spousal gift in this state, it would not necessarily follow
that the courts would sustain the exercise by a husband of such a per-
sonal power to revoke if he uses the power to thwart the original trust
"SHill v. Conover, 12 Cal. Rep. 522 (1961).
In the Katz case, the inclusion of the property within the estate of the husband was
predicated upon §S 2036 and 2038. This would appear to be erroneous, insofar as it applied
to the property contributed to the trust by the wife, as such sections apply only to prior
transfers by the decedent. However, the same result would appear to follow under § 2041,
dealing with powers of appointment, which applies to other powers of equal comprehensive-
ness, and includes powers of revocation. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b) (1961).
"0 Note 29 supra.
41 In one court of civil appeals opinion, the court held without discussion that a gift by
the wifq of her community interest in land to the husband was effective to make the prop-
erty the husband's separate property. Stratton v. Robinson, 67 S.W. 539 (Tex. Civ. App.
1902) error ref. In another court of civil appeals opinion, the court stated in dictum that
the wife has such power. Collett v. Houston & T.C.R.R., 186 S.W. 232 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916) error ref. See also SPEER, MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS (4th ed. 1961); Huie, Com-
munity Property as Applied to Life Insurance, 17 TEXAS L. REv. 121 (1939).
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objectives by vesting title to trust property in himself, individually.
Ordinarily, therefore, it is contemplated that the courts of most com-
munity property states will tend to treat a power to revoke a trust
created with community property as a power exercisable in favor of
the community upon the prior death of the husband.
Prior Death of the Wife If the husband, as manager of the com-
munity, establishes a revocable trust with community funds and the
wife predeceases him, the problem becomes more difficult; and direct
judicial authority on the legal result is lacking. There are several pos-
sibilities. First, it could be argued that the prior death of the wife
has no effect on the revocability of the trust and that the husband,
during his lifetime, continues to have such power of revocation. Sec-
ond, it is possible that the prior death of the wife would result in irrev-
ocability with respect to one-half of the property in the trust. Finally,
it could be argued that at the prior death of the wife, the trust becomes
irrevocable in its entirety.
The result will depend in part upon state law. The statutes in New
Mexico deprive the wife of any power of testamentary disposition
over her community property, and such property belongs to the hus-
band at her death without the necessity of administration upon her
estate."2 Therefore her prior death should have no effect on the power
of the husband to revoke a trust, except possibly where there is a
specific trust provision to the contrary. The law of Nevada' is also
subject to special provisions in the event the wife predeceases the
husband.
In other community property states if a husband establishes a rev-
ocable community property trust, it would seem that if the wife pre-
deceases the husband, the husband should not have the power to re-
voke the entire trust. As pointed out above, the husband is acting for
the community when he establishes the trust, and the right of revoca-
tion is reserved on behalf of the community. The power to revoke
the trust with respect to his wife's interest exists only because of the
marital relationship. Upon the death of the wife, this relationship
terminates, and the husband's authority to act on behalf of the com-
'N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-8 (1953). See also In re Chavez's Estate, 34 N.M. 258, 280
P. 241 (1929); MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS (1952); Clark, Man-
agement and Control of Community Property in New Mexico, 26 TUL. L. REV. 324 (1952).
Hernandez v. Becker, 54 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1931). If the husband predeceases, all of the
husband's estate is subject to administration, and at least one-half, and probably all of it,
is subject to tax. Hurley v. Hartley, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 12,403 (D.N.M. 1966). See also
Swihart, Federal Taxation of New Mexico Community Property, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES
JOURNAL 104 (1963).
' NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.260 (1957). See also MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1952).
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munity ceases. It should follow that the power to revoke the trust in
its entirety also ceases.
Could a continued power to revoke the entire trust be based upon
the premise that the power was a personal one in the husband? Unless
the wife joins in establishing the trust, and makes an effective gift to
her husband in so doing, such a holding would, in effect, be that the
husband has the power to make a gift to himself of his wife's prop-
erty. This he cannot do." Even though he can give community prop-
erty to others, he cannot give it to himself.
If, after the death of the wife, the husband lacks the authority to
revoke the entire trust as agent of the community or in his own per-
sonal right, the literal language of the statute or trust provision cre-
ating the power to revoke might provide support for such a power,
especially if he is designated in the instrument as "trustor" or by
some equivalent term. However, such a construction would permit
the husband to exercise, after the wife's death, a power that he pre-
viously held over her property only in a community property capac-
ity. Such an interpretation would, therefore, be inconsistent with the
basic concept of the husband's authority over his wife's community
property.
Assuming, therefore, that the husband's authority to revoke the
entire trust cannot continue after the death of the wife, in the ab-
sence of an effective gift or peculiarities of state law, does the hus-
band's power to revoke continue with respect to one-half of the
trust? This also appears to be an unlikely result. A trust may be
established to achieve objectives which may be prejudiced by the
removal of one-half of the trust corpus. It has been recognized that
where there are two unrelated settlors, the death of one terminates the
power of both.' Under some circumstances, it would appear to be
a matter of bad faith for the husband to fund a trust with property
belonging to his wife and himself for some legitimate objective of
the marital partnership and, after her death, to withdraw his con-
tribution.
There is an additional problem to partial revocation. Although a
power to revoke may be legally construed to include a power of
partial revocation," there is no basis for creating two trusts out of a
single trust at the death of one of the spouses, each trust having
differing terms with respect to revocability, unless the trust instru-
"4Martin v. Moran, 32 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
'BOGERT, TRUSTS § 1001 (2d ed. 1962).
' 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 330.11 (2d ed. 1956).
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ment so provides. To do so would be a legal novelty which seems un-
likely to be adopted by the courts.
The most reasonable conclusion appears to be that unless the trust
instrument specifically provides otherwise, the entire trust becomes
irrevocable when the wife predeceases the husband. Since it has been
previously shown that such a trust becomes irrevocable if the husband
dies first, such a construction would result in the same rule being ap-
plied, regardless of which spouse predeceased the other.
Incompetency or Divorce of a Spouse Since a power to revoke a
trust is usually construed as a personal one in the sense that it is not
assignable or transferable, the authorities47 as well as the courts" are
in general agreement that incompetency ordinarily suspends a power
to revoke so long as incompetency continues. There is substantial
authority in the federal tax field that a trust will still be treated as
revocable by an incompetent where, under the trust instrument, the
trust is revocable by such person or his guardian,9 except, perhaps,
where no guardian has been appointed." The weight of authority out-
side of the tax area appears to hold that a guardian has no such
power.51 There is, however, the possibility that a court of competent
jurisdiction may be able to exercise the power if the circumstances
of the particular case require it to do so."
The existence of a community property trust may result in the ap-
plication of a different rule. To varying degrees, the community
property states,"a including Texas, 4 provide that when a spouse is ju-
4"BOGERT, TRUSTS § 1000 (2d ed. 1962); 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 330 (2d ed. 1966 supp.).4
'First Nat'l Bank v. Oppenheimer, 92 Ohio L. Abs. 233, 190 N.E.2d 70 (Prob. 1963);
Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 65, 139 N.E.2d 84 (App. 1956); Nat'l Com-
mercial Bank & Trust Co., 50 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup. 1944); Chase Nat'l Bank v. Ginnel, 50
N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. 1944); the same result would probably occur under the Texas Probate
Code § 230(b).
"Trust No. 3 v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1960) (income taxes); Gilmore
v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1954); Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118
(7th Cir. 1951); Griffith v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 12,124 (S.D. Tex. 1962).
50Rev. Rul. 54-91, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 207; Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107 (2d
Cir. 1952); George W. Perkins, 27 T.C. 601 (1956); W. H. Pope, CCH Tax. Ct. Mem.
646 (1953).
5, See Chase Nat'l Bank v. Ginnel, 50 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. 1944); BOGERT, TRUSTS §
1000 (2d ed. 1962).
52 Thus, when the other assets of the incompetent have been exhausted and the property
subject to the trust is needed for his care and support, the court will exercise such power
of revocation. Rickel v. Peck, 211 Minn. 576, 2 N.W.2d 140 (1942); 138 A.L.R. 1375;
cf., TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-24 (1960).
5 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4-8 (1962); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-2001, 15-2011 (1948). In
New Mexico, if the husband has been declared incompetent, the wife still cannot convey or
transfer community realty. Frkovich v. Petranovich, 48 N.M. 382, 151 P.2d 337, 155
A.L.R. 295 (1944). In California, if the wife has been adjudged incompetent, the husband
cannot convey her interest in community realty. Cullen v. Spremo, 142 Cal. App. 2d 225,
298 P.2d 579 (1956).
"
4 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 157 (1956). In a recent case, the husband conveyed the
homestead without his wife's joinder. The court held that if the wife is in fact incompetent,
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dicially declared incompetent, the other spouse acquires power to man-
age, control, and dispose of the entire community estate. In such a
situation, it would appear that upon incompetency of the husband,
the wife might have the authority to exercise the power of revocation
on behalf of an incompetent husband.
In the event of divorce, the possibility of judicial revocation of
the trust would vary with the laws of a particular jurisdiction; but,
in most, the court's authority over property matters would undoubt-
edly be sufficient to reach the trust assets."5 If the divorce decree does
not deal with the revocability issue, a more difficult problem would
be presented. However, it would appear that the considerations which
suggest irrevocability when the wife predeceases the husband would
also suggest irrevocability when the marital relationship is severed by
divorce.
Drafting of Community Property Trusts The impetus which the
revocable trust has recently received from both responsible " and ir-
responsible" ' sources has increased the importance of developing sat-
isfactory solutions to these problems. Two basic patterns appear to be
emerging. One is based on the assumption that the usual intent of
the parties is for the husband to have the power to revoke for the
remainder of his life even if his wife predeceases him, after which the
trust is to become irrevocable. This pattern is especially common for
trusts funded with insurance on the husband's life, which are fre-
quently made revocable during the husband's life in order to elim-
inate gift taxes on premium payments. After his death, the trust con-
tinues on an irrevocable basis in order to assure the availability of the
proceeds of the insurance for the support of the wife, if she survives,
and for the children in any event.
Notwithstanding the disadvantageous tax consequences of such an
arrangement, it may best meet family needs in many cases, provided
such a trust can be validly established under the law of the appli-
cable state. In most states, if this result can be attained at all, it would
require, as we have seen, that the wife give up her interest in the
trust property, making an effective gift to the husband with respect
to the original trust corpus and any amounts subsequently added to
even though she has not been judicially declared so, then 5 157 of the Texas Probate Code
does not preclude the husband's conveyance of such homestead. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 403
S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). For a complete analysis of this area of the law see in
this issue, Comment, Conveying the Homestead Without Joinder of Both Spouses.
'
5 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4638 (1960).
'
0 Casner, Estate Planning-Avoidance of Probate, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 108 (1960).
"rDAcY, How To AvoiD PROBATE (1966); cf., Avoiding Probate, 52 A.B.A.J. 938
(1966). Bush, Do-It-Yourself Guide to Mis-Planned Estates, Harpers, p. 108, Sept. 1966;
The Mess in Our Probate Courts, Readers Digest, p. 102, Oct. 1966.
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it, including premiums paid to maintain trust insurance policies. From
a tax standpoint, the trust property is then equivalent to the hus-
band's separate property, fully includable in his estate."
An alternate approach is to provide for the division of the trust
into two halves, one reflecting contributions of each. Upon the death
of the first spouse, the trust attributable to his interest in the com-
munity takes the form of a conventional testamentary trust; while
the other continues to be revocable (or irrevocable with a retained
general power of appointment) for the remainder of the life of the
surviving spouse.
Practice varies concerning the time at which the two trusts should
come into being. 'When a single trust is divided into two trusts at
the death of the first spouse, there are conceptual problems to the
identification of each trust as representing the property contributed
by a particular spouse. In addition, such an arrangement is not easily
used in the case of insurance trusts unless the insured spouse pre-
deceases the other, as otherwise each trust will own an undivided one-
half interest in an insurance policy or policies on a living person. In
some cases, arrangements are made in advance to separate the policies
at the time of the wife's prior death into two halves, or for one of the
trusts to acquire the interest of the other on some acceptable basis.
An alternate approach is to divide the property into two trusts
when the trusts are first established. In some states the spouses may be
aided in identifying each trust as reflecting the separate contributions
of each by statutes authorizing the partition of property divisible
in kind between the spouses by contract. " The consequences of the
two-share approach, if utilized from the inception of the trusts is, in
effect, to create two trusts, one of which will be treated for tax pur-
poses as the separate property of each spouse.
In any event, the contingency of incompetency, and possibly di-
vorce, must be provided for unless the risk is to be taken that such
an event would produce irrevocability and result in a taxable gift at
that time.
There are, of course, many other powers which a spouse can re-
tain in the establishment of a community property trust. If the power
is broad enough to permit the trust corpus to be withdrawn from the
trust, utilized to defray the legal obligations of the settlor of the trust,
or used for the personal benefit of the settlor, it would appear that a
husband who holds the power should be under a duty to exercise it
" Note 20 supra.
" Polasky, "Pour Over Wills": Use with Inter-Vivos Trusts, 17 Sw. L.J. 410 (1963).
"TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4624a (1960).
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for the benefit of community, in the absence of a transfer between
the spouses as in the Katz case. Powers which might fall into this
category would include general powers of appointment, the power to
withdraw trust assets at will, and unrestricted powers to alter and
amend.
In the event of the death of the wife, where the husband is the
holder of such a power, two results are possible. One would be to
hold that the power continues so long as the holder is living, but that
if exercised, it must be utilized for the joint benefit of the husband
and the wife's estate or heirs. This would result in a variety of prob-
lems if the power is exercised many years later, with anomalous re-
sults in some circumstances. The alternative would be to construe
such powers as subject to the same restrictions on exercise as powers
of revocation. Since the powers are similar in effect, this would ap-
pear to be the more appropriate result.
It is to be noted that powers to withdraw assets and similar powers
benefit either the holder of the power or the community estate which
he represents. The same considerations would not apply to powers
held in a fiduciary capacity, the exercise of which is governed by the
best interests of the beneficiaries of the trust. It is well recognized,
of course, that fiduciary trust powers are ordinarily not personal but
inherent in the office of the trustee and will not terminate at the
death of the holder, even if it is necessary for a court to appoint a
successor trustee to exercise them." It is undoubtedly possible to grant
to an individual a power which will terminate at his death but which
he is required to exercise in a fiduciary capacity. " The considerations
which suggest the termination of nonfiduciary powers upon the
death of either spouse of a community property trust should not be
applicable to fiduciary powers.
II. TRUST INCOME AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Distributed Income The interplay of community property con-
cepts and the equitable principles of trust law also becomes significant
where beneficial interests are involved. The most difficult area is that
of determining the ownership of distributed and undistributed trust
income in the two states, Texas and Idaho, in which income from
separate property is community property."'
61 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-17 (1960); BOGERT, TRUSTS § 553 (2d ed.
1960).
"
2 BOGERT, TRUSTS § 553 (2d ed. 1960).
"'TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4614 (Supp. 1966); IDAHO CODE § 32-903 (1963);
Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925). In New Mexico, Washington,
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For example, consider the common situation in which a parent
creates a trust for the benefit of his child, either before or after the
child's marriage. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held
in a number of tax cases" that the income of such a trust, when dis-
tributed, is community property of the beneficiary and his spouse, if
the income is derived from dividends, rents, or other sources which
would normally be considered community when earned by a married
person from his separate property. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Wilson,
the only recent state court decision in the area, reaches the same
result,"5 although there are a number of earlier decisions" discussed
later in this article which take a different approach.
The principal contention which was made before the circuit court
to avoid the characterization of trust distributions as community was
that the income itself was the gift which the beneficiary had received
from the settlor, and hence was separate property. The refusal of the
court to accept this argument apparently stemmed primarily from
the leading Supreme Court decision of Irwin v. Gavit," in which Jus-
tice Holmes concluded that trust distributions were not gifts for
federal tax purposes on the ground that "a gift of the income of a
fund ordinarily is treated by equity as creating an interest in the
fund." The court held, therefore, that the equitable interest in the
trust was itself the subject matter of the gift. Using this approach,
the circuit court decisions reason that the equitable interest of a
married beneficiary of a trust is also property for purposes of the
community property laws, and that the income derived from it in the
form of trust distributions is, therefore, community property.
The equitable interest theory is more easily accepted where dis-
tributions from the trust are mandatory. For example, if a trust pro-
vides that "the trustee shall distribute to the beneficiary all of the
income of the trust," or "$100 per month out of the income of the
trust," it is apparent that the married beneficiary has substantial
oronertv ri'hts under the trsict instrument which rniv be arnoropri-
Nevada, California and Arizona, income from the wife's separate property remains her sepa-
rate property. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-3-4 (1953); REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 26.16.020
(1961). See also MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS (1952).
64 Commissioner v. Sims, 148 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1945); McFaddin v. Commissioner, 148
F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Snowden, 148 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1945);
Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Wilson, 76 F.2d
766 (5th Cir. 1935); Commisisoner v. Terry, 69 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1934).
65279 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
"6Sullivan v. Skinner, 66 S.W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) error ref.; McClelland v.
McClelland, 37 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896) error ref.; Monday v. Vance, 11 Tex. Civ.
App. 374, 32 S.W. 559 (1895); Shepflin v. Small, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 493, 23 S.W. 432
(1893); Hutcheson v. Mitchell, 39 Tex. 488 (1873).




ately characterized as the property from which the income is derived.
On the other hand, if the power of the trustee to make distributions
is completely discretionary, it may be more difficult to find that the
beneficiary owns a vested "equitable interest" in the corpus of the
trust, since he is entitled to nothing which the corpus produces unless
the trustee decides to distribute such income to him.
Even in the case of a wholly discretionary trust, however, the bene-
ficiary, under some circumstances, can compel distributions."' His
interest is also sufficient to permit him to bring suit to prevent the
trustee from mismanaging the trust." Thus, even in such circum-
stances, it would not appear unreasonable to conclude that the bene-
ficiary has a sufficient interest in the trust so that distributions, if
made to him while married, will be community property. Any other
approach would create the difficult problem of determining in each
particular case whether the degree of discretion over distributions
is sufficient to preclude a community character for the distributions.
The Conduit Principle There is, in addition, a definite conduit
concept incorporated in these decisions. For example, in Commissioner
v. Wilson,1 a married man residing in Texas was the income bene-
ficiary of a trust which consisted of oil and gas interests and other
properties. After reviewing the Texas authorities, the court held that
so much of the trust income distributed to the married beneficiary as
could be shown to have been derived from royalties, including bonus,
was the separate property of such beneficiary, on the basis of the
familiar rule in that state that royalties and bonuses from separate
property are separate property. In McFaddin v. Commissioner7 1 the
character of trust income in the hands of the beneficiary was also
determined as if it had been received directly by the beneficiary
without the intervention of the trust. Under both decisions distribu-
tions from sources other than royalties, such as rents, retained their
community character, since they would have been community if
received directly by the beneficiary.
The conduit principle is unnecessary to the conclusion that dis-
tributed trust income is community property, once it is accepted that
the beneficial interest from which the income is derived is susceptible
of being considered property in itself. Furthermore, the use of the
conduit principle may occasion serious legal and administrative prob-
lems, since the rules for computing income for purposes of fiduciary
69See, e.g., In re Lachmann's Estate, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674, 320 P.2d 186 (1958). See
also BOGERT, TRUSTS § 560 (2d ed. 1960).
" See BOGERT, TRUSTS § 560 (2d ed. 1960).
7'76 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935).
72 148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945).
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accounting may differ substantially from the rules applicable to de-
termining income in order to distinguish community from separate
property.
An obvious example is that trustees subject to the Texas Trust
Act calculate depletion on oil and gas income in a different manner"
from the way in which oil income is divided between principal and
income for common law life estates." The latter rule is utilized for
community property purposes"3 and was followed in the Wilson case.
Another example of the difference between trust and community
property accounting is that, in the former, trustees may be given dis-
cretion to distinguish between income and principal."0 On the other
hand, the parties have no power to alter, by agreement, the rules under
which income is to be identified for purposes of segregating com-
munity and separate property in a state such as Texas."
Under present law, trustees compute income for federal tax pur-
poses under different rules from those which apply for fiduciary ac-
counting purposes, although the federal regulations rely on state law
to determine corpus and income in many respects." It is conceivable
that one set of rules might be used to determine how much money
the fiduciary should distribute, another to determine how much of
each distribution is community property, and a third to determine the
taxable income of the trust.7 In a substantial trust, however, even if
the trustee is willing to operate under three accounting systems, the
computation of income and principal based strictly on the source of
the funds distributed becomes extremely difficult.
These problems are illustrated by the McFaddin case. There the
corpus of the trust included two cattle ranches, several farms, and
large amounts of rental property. The trustee had also executed an
oil and gas lease on one of the ranches. Throughout the operation of
the trust, large sums of money from rents, cattle operations, sales of
properties, and royalties had been deposited in a common bank ac-
count from which operating expenses were paid, indebtedness dis-
charged, and new purchases of cattle and additional lands made. An
amount equivalent to the net income of the trust, as computed by
the trustees, was also distributed to the beneficiaries annually from
the same account.
" TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-33 (1960).
'
4
Youngman v. Shular, 281 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), aff'd, 155 Tex. 437,
288 S.W.2d 495 (1956).
,"Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
"
6
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-26 (1960).
"'Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902).
"E.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.661(b)-1, 1.661(a)-2(e), 1.661(b)-2 (1956).
"Browning, Problems of Fiduciary Accounting, 26 N.Y.U.L. REV. 931 (1961).
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The Tax Court in McFaddin had proceeded on the theory that the
problem of commingled trust income was not present since the court
concluded that the undistributed income of the trust was not com-
munity property of the beneficiaries. In rejecting this theory, the
Fifth Circuit stated that:
[T]he taxpayers were the beneficial owners of the trust properties, and
every part and parcel of them, including income from them, belonged
beneficially to them, either as separate or as community property in the
same way that it would have belonged to them had the property been
deeded to the taxpayers and operated by themselves. The greater part
of the normal income from the property during the years preceding the
tax years in question was community income. When it was commingled
in a common bank account with other funds of the trust so that the
constituents had lost their identity, the whole fund became community,
and, when it was used by the trustees to purchase additional properties,
those properties, taking the character of the funds which bought them,
were community property."0
However, the appellate court did conclude that "the oil royalties
and bonuses derived from, and the profits from sales of, the properties
originally conveyed in trust to the separate beneficial interests of the
taxpayers came to them as separate property and are taxable as sep-
arate income"'" and remanded the case with directions to determine
how much of the claimed separate income came from the original
and how much from the after-acquired property.
The McFaddin decision specifically rejects the idea that the bene-
ficial interest in the trust itself is the property which produces the
income and attempts to distinguish between distributions of com-
munity and separate funds by viewing the properties held in trust as
if owned by the beneficiary. Even here, where all of the net income
was distributable annually, and the beneficiaries upon termination
were the same persons as the income beneficiaries, tracing became
impractical and the court was forced to apply the presumption that
commingling creates community, although it was unwilling to fol-
low the presumption entirely. An attempt to segregate corpus and
income by tracing where diverse assets are held in trust would pre-
sent even more difficulty where irregular distributions are made to
multiple beneficiaries under discretionary distribution provisions.
In the ordinary case of community property where no trust is in-
volved, the commingling principle, which is relied on so strictly in
8°Note 72 supra, at 573. (Emphasis added.)
81 Note 72 supra, at 572-73.
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the earlier cases, " is being applied with a less heavy hand today, 3
influenced undoubtedly by the fact that detailed accounting records
are now usually available to overcome the presumption which com-
mingling creates." More is required than accounting records to di-
vide commingled separate and community property, however. Guide
lines which have developed include the concept that a separate estate
is entitled to be reimbursed for advances to the community, at least to
the extent that the community estate has benefited by the advances,
and the principle that community expenses are to be considered as
coming first out of community income." While these principals do
not make accounting for community and separate property simple,
even if complete accounting data is available, they at least make
it possible.
The use of basic concepts of trust accounting, in lieu of commun-
ity property concepts, to distinguish between community and sep-
arate property when distributed to the beneficiary of a trust finds
support in Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Wilson. In this case, the con-
tention was made that the original corpus had become so commingled
with the trust income during the marriage that a large portion of the
trust corpus had become community property. The court concluded
as follows:
[P]roperly considered, the trustees under such instrument were bound
to first pay out or expend the income from the trust before paying out
or expending the corpus of the trust, and in our opinion there is a pre-
sumption that the trustee and substitute trustee did, as was his duty,
first pay out or expend such income before paying out or expending the
corpus of the trust .... It follows that they were, therefore, required
to pay out income first, and even if such income was commingled with
corpus funds, it will be presumed that the first moneys paid out, until
all income was exhausted, was in fact income."
Therefore, the Mercantile decision rejects the application of the com-
8
2Gaulding v. Gaulding, 256 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Moore v. Moore, 192
S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Ervin v. Ervin, 128 S.W. 1139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910)
error dism.; Moor v. Moor, 255 S.W. 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900).
a3Blumer v. Kallison, 297 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; Hartman
v. Hartman, 253 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Hudspeth v. Hudspeth, 198 S.W.2d
768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error 'ref. n.r.e.
4 Pearce, Presumption of Community Ownership in Texas Commingling Cases, 36 TExAs
L. REv. 196 (1957).
S Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935); Snodgrass v. Robertson, 167
S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. w.m.; Lamar Life Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 163
S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref. w.m.; SPEER, MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS
343 (4th ed. 1961).
86Barrington v. Barrington, 290 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Sibley v. Sibley,




munity property commingling concept at the trust level and accepts
general principles of trust accounting-aided, in this case, by provi-
sions of the trust instrument-as an appropriate guide, not only to
determine income and corpus for trust accounting purposes, but also
to determine the community and separate property character of dis-
tributions.
Such an approach is consistent with community property law, if it
is accepted that trust property is neither community nor separate,
but property of the trust. From this point of view, the collective
rights of the beneficiary, viewed as an abstraction, are considered as
the "property" from which the income flows, and distributions are
classified as community income when made out of income of the trust,
as determined for trust accounting purposes, much as corporate divi-
dends are community income when declared in cash or property out of
accumulated corporate profits.88 Similarly, under this approach, cor-
pus distributions from a trust are treated as separate property just as
dividends paid by a corporation out of capital are separate89 property
where the stock itself is separate.
Undistributed Income A final difficulty with the conduit prin-
ciple is that it tends to suggest that a community estate might have
an interest in undistributed income of a trust established for the
benefit of one of the spouses by gift. Such an approach would un-
doubtedly be inconsistent with the intent of the settlor in most cases.
In addition it would cause endless problems in the administration of
trusts, requiring fiduciaries to maintain a record of the marital status
of the spouses and to account for the equity of the silent partner of
the beneficiary.
There appear to be have been only two cases actually decided on the
community property status of undistributed trust income. In the
earlier, McClelland v. McClelland,"8 the testator devised to his son, in
trust, all of the residue of his estate. The trustee was to distribute
only $150 per month to the son; and, except for these monthly dis-
tributions, all other rents, profits, etc., arising from the residue were
to be accumulated.
In a divorce suit, the son's wife alleged that the rents from such
realty had been accumulating since the marriage of herself with the
son, and that such accumulated rents constituted their community
"SScofield v. Weiss, 131 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1942); Fain v. Fain, 93 S.W.2d 1226 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1936) error dism.
"9Scofield v. Weiss, 131 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1942); SPEER, MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS
428 (4th ed. 1961).
" 37 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896) error ref.
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property. In holding that the wife had no claim to such accumulated
rents in the hands of the trustee, the court stated:
The will, with the codicil, in effect is what is technically understood to
be a spendthrift trust. The power of a testator at this date to make
such a disposition of his property cannot be questioned .... It is appar-
ent that the scheme of the testator was to place all of his estate, to-
gether with the revenues and income that should arise from it, in the
possession and keeping of the trustees named in the will, to be held by
them during the lifetime of [the son] subject only to a liability in his
favor for the amount stated as set apart for his support. Those of his
creditors or others who should seek an interest in the estate through
him will have no greater right than he would have, and the limitation
upon his right thus imposed would extend to a claim asserted by his
wife, who was seeking to recover an interest in this estate. If the income
arising from the estate was not available to [the son] and could not be
reached by him, the right of his wife would be no greater than his ...
Our conclusion is that [the wife] had no interest in the property con-
veyed by the will that she could reach.9
Such an approach seems necessary if the trust device is to serve in
a community property state as a means by which properties may be
placed in safe hands until a designated future date when distributions
will be made. Certainly, it could not be said that the son would have
had one-half of the undistributed trust income as an asset of his
estate had he died prior to the time he was entitled to receive such
income. It should follow, as the court held, that the community
estate of the beneficiary and his spouse could have no greater claim
to such income.
Again, the corporate analogy suggests itself. It is clear that cor-
porate stock owned by a husband prior to his marriage or given to
him during his marriage is his separate property, regardless of in-
creases in value due to retained corporate earnings."2 The wife, in a
divorce suit, cannot claim any interest in undistributed corporate
earnings, nor force a distribution, even though a distribution, if made,
would be community property." Furthermore, although the direc-
tors of a corporation have a broad measure of discretion in deter-
mining the amount of dividend distributions, as do the trustees of a
discretionary trust, the discretion of both is subject to equitable
limitations."
91 Note 90 supra, at 3 58-59. See also Hoffman v. Rose, 217 S.W. 424 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920) error ref.
92 SPEER, MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS § 427 (4th ed. 1961).
9' Ibid.
"In re Lachmann's Estate, 320 P.2d 186, 156 Cal. App. 2d 674 (1958); Moroney v.
Moroney, 286 S.W. 167 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926); BOGERT, TRUSTS § 560 (2d ed. 1960).
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Nevertheless, the Mercantile Nat'l Bank" case, which was decided
in 1955, casts some doubt on the status of undistributed income. In
this case, a suit was brought by a community creditor against the
wife after her husband's death. Subsequent to the death of the hus-
band, the wife had received distributions from a trust of which she
had been the beneficiary, and which had been established prior to her
marriage. The terminating distributions included income accumulated
in the trust during marriage.
The daughter contended that such income was not liable for com-
munity indebtedness since "undistributed income of the trust is not
community property."9 During the course of its opinion, the court
stated that:
[T]he first and preliminary material question, in our opinion, is whether
or not the undistributed profits or income from the trust in the hands
of the trustee is community property. We must answer that the income
on the trust corpus was community property from the date of the mar-
riage of appellee to George 0. Wilson, now deceased, until the time of
the death of George 0. Wilson. 7
In spite of this statement, the court of civil appeals reached the
conclusion that Mr. Wilson's creditors had no claim to the undis-
tributed income of the trust on the grounds that it was part of his
wife's "special community" under applicable Texas statutes." When
an application for writ of error was filed with the Supreme Court, it
was refused on the grounds that "no reversible error" was present.
Perhaps we may assume that the Supreme Court doubted the cor-
rectness of the court of civil appeals' views on undistributed income
but regarded them as dicta, since a holding that the undistributed
funds were not the property of either spouse, but rather of the trust,
would have produced the same result."
The Significance of Spendthrift Clauses One way in which the
Wilson case and the McClelland case might be distinguished is that
the trust in McClelland contained a valid spendthrift trust clause
which prevented the son from reaching prospective trust distributions
until actually distributed to hlm. In the Wilson case, on the other
9s279 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
96 Id. at 652.
07 Note 95 supra, at 653-54. (Emphasis added.)
"' The special community concept may relieve the trustee from liability for distributing
the husband's community share of trust income to the wife, under a trust established by gift
or devise for her benefit. However, the concept does not provide a basis for ignoring the
husband's interest in such income for other purposes, such as division of property at death
or divorce.
"Glass v. Carpenter, 330 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.; McFaddin
v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945). Contra, Booth v. Chadwick, 154 S.W.2d
268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref. w.m.
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hand, the spendthrift trust clause appears to have been invalid, since
the settlor was also the sole beneficiary.'00
The presence of a spendthrift trust clause, though emphasized in
the McClelland case, does not provide a very satisfactory basis for de-
termining whether undistributed trust income is subject to the
community property claims of the spouse of a beneficiary. A leading
recent decision supports the view that this issue should turn upon
more fundamental and generally applicable criteria.
In Herring v. Blakeley,"' the Texas Supreme Court was called upon
to decide whether or not an interest under a profit sharing trust,
together with rights under a retirement annuity agreement, were
"property" and, if so, whether such property was community prop-
erty. The husband's participation in both commenced during mar-
riage and the contributions by the employer for the husband's ac-
count, as well as by the husband himself, had been made during the
marriage. The benefits under both plans were payable only upon the
husband's death or termination of employment by retirement or
otherwise. Although anticipation was forbidden by spendthrift pro-
visions"' and clauses forbidding assignment, the rights of the hus-
band under both agreements were "vested" in the sense that the
employee had participated for a long enough period so that under the
provisions of the agreements his beneficial interests were not subject
to reduction in the event of termination of employment.
Prior to the husband's death, he and his wife were divorced. Upon
the death of the husband, the wife claimed that she was entitled to
one-half of the value of the husband's interest under the profit-
sharing trust, as well as the annuity plan, determined as of the date
of divorce, on the grounds that the rights of the husband under both
plans were community property. The supreme court, in sustain-
ing her position, found that "the ownership of this account was un-
conditional" '' and that "the employee's vested interest in the plan
has all the attributes of property, and we hold that it was property at
the time of the divorce."'" The court then concluded that both
" The validity of the spendthrift provision might be sustained by the particular cir-
cumstances under which the trust was created. Although the settlor was also sole beneficiary,
the trust corpus had been a gift from the settlor's parents immediately prior to the estab-
lishment of the trust, apparently with a pre-existing understanding that the trust would be
established. It may be possible, therefore, to treat the parents as the real settlors, in which
event the spendthrift trust clause would presumably be valid.
10' 385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965).
... Since the husband's "interest" under the trust was received as compensation for
services, there is some doubt as to the validity of the spendthrift trust clause. Cf., McFaddin
v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945).
20 Note 101 supra, at 845.
104 Note 101 supra, at 845-46.
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were community property even though neither spouse could compel
distributions at the time of divorce. In reaching this result, the court
held that "there is no requirement in Texas that community property
must be reducible to immediate possession before a divorce court can
take jurisdiction to determine the parties' rights therein. Community
rights may exist in interests that cannot be reduced to possession,
such as remainder or reversion rights.'
10 5
Herring v. Blakely does not hold that undistributed income in a
trust established for the benefit of one spouse is subject to the com-
munity property claims of the other in the event of a divorce. As
shown by the decision, a trust in which both members of the com-
munity will have property rights can be created not only by trans-
fers of community property to a trustee retaining income or other
rights under the trust for the benefit of the community, but also by
the performance of services during marriage in consideration of
which a trust is established. Mrs. Herring was, at the time of divorce,
just as much an owner of the beneficial rights under the profit shar-
ing trust as was her husband. On the other hand, had the trust been
established as a gift by a relative for Mr. Herring's personal benefit,
the equitable interest of the beneficiary would have been his separate
property. Distributed income would still have been community, but
undistributed income would not have been reflected in the value of
the community estate unless the conduit approach were used.
Herring v. Blakeley leaves undecided the obvious question of how
the interest of the wife would have been satisfied and liquidated had
the property settlement occurred while Herring was living and em-
ployed.' The fact that the court recognizes that the right to benefits
under a trust do not have to be possessory to be "property" does not
mean that a beneficial interest in a trust will change from separate
property to community property because benefits are accruing at the
trust level. The emphasis in Herring v. Blakeley that the beneficial
interest under the profit sharing trust was property itself appears to
strengthen the concept of Irwin v. Gavit in Texas.
105 Note 101 supra, at 847.
'Brief of Amicus Curiae, Herring v. Blakely, 385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965); The
Committee on Community Property Problems Having Significant Tax Implications, Tax
Section, State Bar of Texas. The decision also leaves unanswered whether the interest of a
beneficiary under a profit sharing trust is 'property" for community property purposes
where his rights are unvested or only partially vested. If the approach of Irwin v. Gavit is
used, such beneficial rights may be regarded as community property, but as having no value,
or as being incapable of valuation, under such circumstances. The theory of Irwin v. Gavit
would provide a basis for valuing the interest of the beneficiary without specific reference
to the value of the underlying assets. This approach might provide a practical basis for
avoiding the difficulties which would arise if the courts should hold that the spouse of the




III. CAPACITY OF SETTLOR To CONTROL CHARACTER OF
DISTRIBUTED INCOME
Although two of the legal theories discussed above support the con-
clusion that distributions from the income of a trust to a married
beneficiary should be treated as community property during his
marriage, there are several earlier Texas cases which suggest that it
may be possible to change this result if sufficiently clear provisions
are inserted in the trust instrument. For example, two court of civil
appeals decisions"" have held that where the husband and wife con-
veyed the wife's separate property to a trustee with a provision that
the proceeds from the separate property were to be paid for the sup-
port of the wife and her children, such a conveyance successfully
withdrew the rent from the community estate, thereby resulting in
such income being the wife's separate property.
It has been pointed out. 8 that this concept of making trust income
a beneficiary's separate property simply by having the trustor show
that this is his intent in "clear and unmistakable language" is difficult
to reconcile with the decisions of the Texas Supreme Court.0 . to the
effect that the community or separate character of property is de-
termined by the constitution and applicable statutes and not by the
intent of the parties, however clearly such intent may be stated.
It may be possible to explain these cases on a gift theory. It is
clear in Texas that a person cannot make a gift or community which
is not yet in being."' However, it has also been held that:
[T]his rule has no reference to the well recognized right of the husband
to make to his wife a gift of his interest in the community property
then in esse, when it can be done without injury to the rights of
others ... this is simply doing with his property what he has the right
to do. Hence, while it may be conceded that the community status of
rents collected was not affected by the mere agreement between [the
husband] and his wife, made when he conveyed the property to her,
yet if this agreement was thereafter observed and actually carried out,
and the rents delivered into the possession of the wife, as the evidence
discloses and the jury has found, then the collected rents became the
separate property of [the wife] unless the gift was in fraud of the rights
of creditors."'
Thus, it might be argued that when the instrument makes it clear
"'Monday v. Vance, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 374, 32 S.W. 599 (1895); Shepflin v. Small,
4 Tex. Civ. App. 493, 23 S.W. 432 (1893).
108 HUIE, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF TEXAS (rev. ed. 1960).
" Tittle v. Tittle, 148 Tex. 102, 220 S.W.2d 637 (1949); Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex.
160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902).
"0See, e.g., Chandler v. Alamo Mfg. Co., 140 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
"'Armstrong v. Turbeville, 216 S.W. 1101, 1106 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error dism.
See also Cadwell v. Dabney, 208 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
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that the income is to belong to the wife, and any such income is
thereafter actually distributed to her, then the husband has made an
effective gift of his interest in such income to his wife, and converted
it into her separate property. If the courts continue to so hold, it may
be possible to control the character of distributed income in the case
of such trusts by the way the trust is drafted.
Some of the cases which recognize the effectiveness of trust lan-
guage to control the classification of distributions as community
or separate property involve trusts established by third parties. For
example, in Sullivan v. Skinner,"' a father had devised certain prop-
erty to his daughter for her sole and separate use during her lifetime,
with the corpus passing to her children upon death. In holding that
the rents derived from such property were the daughter's separate
property and not subject to her husband's creditors, the court placed
great emphasis upon the provisions of the will which stated that the
property was given to the daughter "for the term of her natural life,
with full power to receive for her sole and separate use, and no other,
with rents and profits of the same, and on her death the same to belong
to any child or children of the said [wife]..'. The court held that
such language of the will meant that the rents and profits the wife
was empowered to receive "excluded the right of her husband to any
interest in the rents and profits, and made them her separate prop-
erty., ,114
The doubtful nature of this concept has been noted by the fed-
eral courts. Thus, as stated in the decision of Commissioner v. Porter:
[W]e are not prepared to go as far as the taxpayers do in their claim,
that under the laws of Texas, a trust could not be validly created upon
terms giving income to a wife or a husband, for life, as their separate
property. . . . [B]ut in view of the generally prevailing rule in Texas,
that income from separate property falls when received into the com-
munity, it is certainly true that if by a use of a trust instrument this
general rule can be departed from, the instrument must, in the most
precise and definite way, and by the use of language of unmistakable
intent, make that desire and intention clear. 1 '
In the McClelland case, as discussed earlier, the married son's fa-
ther had established a testamentary trust under which the son was to
receive $150 per month during his lifetime. Such distributions were
made to the son and, in a divorce suit, the court held that the wife
had no interest in such distributed income. The court apparently
12 66 S.W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) error ref.
"' Id. at 681. (Emphasis added.)
114 Note 112 supra, at 681.
"5 148 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1945). See also Commissioner v. Hinds, 180 F.2d 930
(5th Cir. 1950) (concurring opinion).
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concluded that such distributed income was the son's separate prop-
erty because he had received it by will. Unless there is a distinction
between an inter vivos gift to a trust beneficiary and a testamentary
gift devised to him, this holding would appear to be in conflict with
the cases discussed earlier holding that the gift to an income bene-
ficiary of a trust is not a gift of the income itself but a gift of an
equitable interest in the corpus of the trust. Apparently, the court in
the McClelland case did not view the bequest to the son as an equit-
able interest in the corpus but as the income itself.'16 There appears
to be no way in which to justify such a conversion into separate prop-
erty of income which would otherwise be community, by a third par-
ty settlor, without such a rejection of the doctrine of Irwin v. Gavit.
IV. CONCLUSION
Additional precedent will be required before it is clear in which
direction the decisions on trust income will go. The concept that, for
community property purposes, the property which the beneficiary
owns is his equitable interest in the trust, is an approach which ap-
pears consistent with the fundamental legal concepts in the area, and
which would provide a uniform and workable guide for identifying
the ownership of trust income in community situations. The cases
treating the beneficiary as if he owned an interest in the underlying
properties, at one extreme, or as if he had received by gift only the
actual trust distributions themselves, at the other, may result in a
satisfactory result in a particular case, but do not appear to provide
the basis for a practical and uniform over-all development of the
law of trusts as applied to community property.
The concept of Irwin v. Gavit that the collective rights and bene-
fits of the beneficiary is property in itself is also more consistent
with the law as it is developing in the revocable trust area. It is rea-
sonably clear that community and separate property states agree that
even a revocable trust is a distinct property-owning entity. Where
revocation or equivalent trust powers are held for the benefit of a
marital community, it appears that with the exception of one or two
states in which the community principle is not carried through con-
sistently to the estates of the spouses, the consequences of death, in-
capacity and divorce will conform with the generally applicable rules
in other states, provided it is recognized that such powers are owned
by partners whose authority to act for one another varies with
individual circumstances and individual states.
"OCf., Lucas v. Lucas, 365 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
1966]
